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Abstract
This paper studies the implications of interregional redistributive taxation on
interregional and interpersonal inequality and on social welfare. We introduce
a model of two regions, where individuals are diﬀerentiated by their ability and
opportunity, the former being determined by heritage and the latter by their
residence. Moreover, agents are immobile and respond to interregional trans-
fers by adjusting their labour supply, rather than by re-locating. The analysis
shows, ﬁrstly, that increases in the rate of interregional redistribution need not
generate neither reduced interregional inequality nor higher social welfare, and
secondly, that their eﬀects are highly dependent on the initial state of the econ-
omy. In particular, interregional redistribution seems most likely to be beneﬁcial
in terms of interregional and interpersonal equity as well as social welfare in low-
tax economies, where the degree of income dispersion is high between, but not
within regions.
1. Introduction
A subject of contention on today’s political agenda is to what extent rich regions should
share their aﬄuence with less fortunate communities. Due to the interregional diﬀer-
ences in average factor income that prevail within as well as between European coun-
tries,a number of redistributive tax programs have been introduced during the last
decades,with the intention to equalize regional income.
In Sweden,for example,the system for reducing interregional ﬁscal disparities has
four components,income equalization,cost equalization,transitional regulation and
general government grants.1 The latter type of grant includes compensation for ad-
verse structural circumstances,such as long distances,cold temperature,demographic
1In addition to these explicit systems of interregional redistribution, factor income is also trans-
ferred endogenously from rich to poor regions via for example the unemployment insurance systemdiﬀerences or sparse population.2 In 2002,nine out of 2 80 municipalities and one out of
20 county councils made net contributions to the equalization system. The largest and
smallest net grant per inhabitant amounted to SEK 23 194 and SEK -11 675,and was
received by Dorotea (in the county of Lapland) and Danderyd (in the county of Stock-
holm),respectively. These net grants accounted for 89 and 26 per cent,respectively,of
the regional tax revenue per capita in Dorotea and Danderyd in the same year. Finally,
while the income and cost equalizing part of the system was in principle self-ﬁnancing
in 2002,the remaining parts accounted for xx per cent of total transfers in Sweden. In
particular,general government grants to municipalities and county councils amounted
to SEK 51,8 billion and SEK 17,7 billion, respectively.
Another example is the European Union,where four so-called structural funds have
been established with the intention of supporting weak member regions. For instance,
the funds encourage the restructuring and modernization of rural areas and low-income
regions,and support the training of the unemployed,particularly those who are young
or have been out of work for a long time. In 2002,the expenditures of the structural
funds accounted for more than a third of the union’s budget.
Interregional income redistribution also takes place to various extents within most
European countries,which has spurred a large empirical literature investigating the eﬃ-
ciency and equitableness of ﬁscal equalization between regions. For instance,Decressin
[1999] examines the degree of income redistribution and risk sharing among Italian
regions,and its implications for public policy,while Berthold et al [2001] study the
German system of ﬁscal federalism and its eﬀects on growth. Further,Garcia-Mila and
McGuire [2001] evaluate the eﬃciency of EU grants as well as interregional transfers
among the regional governments of Spain.
In addition to being empirically explored,the topics of ﬁscal federalism and interre-
gional income equalization have also been subject to a substantial amount of theoretical
(”accidental redistribution”). Also, to the extent that income-based tax schedules and transfer systems
are progressive, income is equalized not only among individuals, but also across regions.
2For a detailed description of the Swedish system for ﬁscal equalization, see for instance SCB,
Statistiska meddelanden OE SM 0201.
2work. The primary concern of these studies has typically been to study the optimal
design of (redistributive) tax policy. In particular,one strand of this literature focuses
on the ﬁrst-best design of interregional grants when tax bases are mobile or when there
are externalities in the provision of public goods and services (e.g.,Boadway and Flat-
ters [1982],Brown and Oates [1987],Myers [1990],Wildasin [1991] and Caplan et al.
[2000]),while another concentrates on the most eﬃcient redistributive policy under in-
complete information (e.g.,Cornes and Silva [2002] and Bordignon et al. [2001]). The
eﬃciency of centralized vs decentralized tax policy is discussed in Inman and Rubinfeld
[1996],while the equity and eﬃciency arguments for interregional income equalization
are reviewed and commented in Oakland [1994].
Contrary to previous work within the theoretical ﬁeld,I abstract in this paper from
the optimal design of interregional transfer systems,and focus instead on their implica-
tions in terms of eﬃciency and equity. Speciﬁcally,the paper addresses the important
questions whether interregional redistribution unambiguously equalizes regional income,
and under which conditions interregional transfers are most likely to enhance interre-
gional and interpersonal equity as well as society’s welfare. The novelty of the analysis
is twofold. Firstly,I consider an alternative externality of interregional transfers to
what has been common in past work; in this context,individuals are assumed to be im-
mobile and to respond to interregional redistribution by changing their labour supply,
rather than their residence. Secondly,I assume that heterogeneity is two-dimensional,
thus agents are diﬀerentiated by individual- as well as region-speciﬁc characteristics.
The paper presents a simple model of an economy consisting of two regions,which
diﬀer from each other with respect to their employment opportunities,and are popu-
lated by talented and non-talented individuals,respectively. Labour income depends on
talent and job opportunities,thus individual and regional disparities imply that average
income diﬀers between the two neighbourhoods. In each period,income is taxed and
redistributed from the rich to the poor neighbourhood,the sole aim of redistribution be-
ing to reduce regional income diﬀerentials. However,in addition to equalizing income,
interregional redistributive taxation aﬀects individuals’ incentives to work,which in
3turn alters the pre-tax distribution of income. Consequently,the eﬀects of increasing
the rate of interregional redistribution are uncertain on interregional and interpersonal
inequality as well as on society’s welfare.
Two main conclusions emerge from the analysis. The ﬁrst is that increases in the
rate of interregional redistribution need not give rise to neither declining interregional
inequality nor increasing social welfare. The second is that the initial rate of interre-
gional redistributive taxation as well as the degree of pre-tax income dispersion and the
degree of intra-regional income heterogeneity seem to be highly critical to the eﬀects
of an increase in redistributive taxation. In particular,interregional redistributive tax
schedules seem most likely to reduce interregional and interpersonal inequality as well
as to increase social welfare in low-tax economies where the pre-tax dispersion of income
is wide between,but narrow within regions.
The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections outline the theoretical
model and its equilibrium properties. In Section 4,the eﬀects of income redistribution
on interregional and interpersonal inequality,and on society’s welfare are analyzed.
Finally,Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
Consider an economy with missing asset markets that consists of two spatially separated
neighbourhoods, ℵrich and ℵpoor. The economy is populated by a unit mass continuum
of inﬁnitely-lived individuals, who are diﬀerentiated by their residence, ℵ, and their
talent, ξ, the latter reﬂecting their aptitude for perceiving new concepts and dealing
with advanced tasks. Talent can take on two values, ξ and ξ, where ξ < ξ, and is
assigned randomly to each individual. It follows that there are four types of agents,
which are characterized by their talent on the one hand, and their residence on the other.

















, where α + β + ϕ + γ =1 .
In each period, agents allocate their time between working, l, and leisure, 1−l, where
l ∈{ 0,￿}. All agents have identical preferences, which are deﬁned over consumption,
4c, and leisure, and are formally represented as3
u = c
θ (1 − l)
1−θ (2.1)
There is no interregional mobility, and agents supply their labour in their home
neighbourhood. Moreover, the two neighbourhoods are diﬀerentiated by their employ-
ment opportunities, but are otherwise identical. In ℵrich, there are high-paying as well
as low-paying jobs, while in ℵpoor, there are only low-paying jobs.4 An agent’s labour
income, w, depends on her talent as well as on the job opportunities of her neighbour-









= f (ξ,ℵpoor) and w>w. For simplicity, we deﬁne
y ≡ ￿w and x ≡ ￿w. Non-working individuals who receive no non-labour income collect
fruit and berries costlessly in the backyard, thereby earning a non-pecuniary subsistence
wage, q.
Finally, there is a government, that taxes income proportionally at the rate τ in
the rich neighbourhood and uses the proceeds of taxation to ﬁnance transfers τz to
3Due to the simplicity of the setting, particularly the absence of asset markets and intertemporal
considerations, we may assume that individuals’ time horizon be ﬁnite without loss of generality.
4An interpretation of this assumption is that ”rich” and ”poor” regions represent metropolitan and
rural areas, respectively, rather than for example neighbour cities or suburbs. This is, ﬁrstly, because
labour markets are typically geographically separated in the former case, and common in the latter,
and secondly, because the supply of high-paying jobs is naturally higher in urban than in rural regions.
Another explanation of regional disparities in employment opportunities is provided by Rosen [200x],
who argues that to the extent that goods and services are locally produced as well as consumed,
interregional inequality in income as well as job opportunities may be self-reinforcing. The reason is
that high-income earners tend to demand a larger variety of goods and services, thus, a wider range
of jobs, including more sophisticated ones, are created in high-income regions.
5For a discussion of the concept of individual talent and empirical evidence in favour of a positive
relationship between earnings and intellectual ability, see for example Behrman et al. [1981]. An
alternative way to model income diﬀerentials within a neighbourhood is to assume individual disparities
in factor endowments, as in for instance Wildasin [1991], where poor agents own only (low-skill) labour,
while the rich own a combination of production factors, such as high-skill labour and a ﬁxed factor,
typically some natural resource.
5the poor neighbourhood, the aim of redistribution being to equalize average regional






ϕ+γτ (αy + βx)i f lα = lβ = ￿
1
ϕ+γταy if lα = ￿, lβ =0
0i f lα = lβ =0
(2.2)
where z is the tax base, τz is the transfer per head from the rich to the poor region
and lα and lβ are the labour supply choices of high-paid and low-paid residents of ℵrich,
respectively. The transfer may be interpreted as a subsidy to the public provision of
private goods and services, such as social security beneﬁts, health care and education.
This interpretation implies that to residents of ℵpoor, the transfer is a close substitute
to labour income. Hence, in addition to equalizing regional income, redistribution from
ℵrich to ℵpoor worsens the incentives to work for residents of not only the providing, but
also the recipient region.
In each period, each individual maximizes her instantaneous utility, as given by
(2.1), subject to the conditions below. Note that in the case where residents of ℵrich as
well as ℵpoor supply zero labour units, the tax base is zero and thus all agents in the




        
        
(1 − τ)y if ℵ = ℵrich, ξ = ξ, l = ￿
(1 − τ)x if ℵ = ℵrich, ξ = ξ, l = ￿
q if ℵ = ℵrich, l =0
x + τz if ℵ = ℵpoor, l = ￿
τz if ℵ = ℵpoor, l =0 ,z>0
q if ℵ = ℵpoor, l =0 ,z =0
In order not to overburden the exposition, it is convenient to deﬁne the following
constants.
Deﬁnition 1. Deﬁne the constants λ ≡ (1 − ￿)
1−θ






Solving the maximization problem yields two decision rules. The ﬁrst is that high-
paid residents of ℵrich, that is agents of type α, devote time to labour as well as to
leisure if u[(1 −τ)y,1 − ￿] ≥ u[q,1], that is if the tax rate, τ, falls below
λy−q
λy . Like-
wise, low-paid residents of ℵrich,t h a ti sa g e n t so ft y p eβ, ﬁnd it worthwhile to work if
6u[(1 − τ)x,1 − ￿] ≥ u[q,1], that is if τ is less than
λx−q
λx . The second rule is that resi-
dents of ℵpoor, that is agents of type ϕ and type γ, can aﬀord cutting down their labour
supply and enjoying more leisure if u[τz,1] ≥ u[x + τz,1 − ￿], that is if τ> λx
(1−λ)z or,
in other words, if the transfer level exceeds
λx
1−λ. Note that the non-negativity condition
on
λx−q
λx implies that the transfer at which residents of ℵpoor decide to quit working,
λx
1−λ,
is clearly higher than the subsistence level of consumption, q.
3. Equilibrium
The model generates four stationary equilibria, in each of which the respective shares
of each individual type are equi-proportionate and equal to 1
4.6 Thus, by (2.2) the
transfer, τz, equals
1
2τ (x + y) if all residents of ℵrich devote ￿ units each to working,
and
1
2τy if only high-paid agents ﬁnd it worthwhile to do so.
Deﬁnition 2. The degree of interregional inequality in equilibrium k, Σk, is measured
by the diﬀerence in average after-tax income of the residents in ℵrich and ℵpoor, respec-
tively. Further, the degree of interpersonal inequality in equilibrium k, σk, is measured
by the variance in personal income net of taxes. Finally, society’s welfare in equilibrium
k, Wk, is measured by the sum of individuals’ utilities. 7
3.1. Equilibrium 1
In the ﬁrst equilibrium, taxes are not high enough to impose any distortions on any
agent’s decisions. Thus, all individuals supply ￿ units each of labour and devote the
rest of their time to leisure. The suﬃcient and necessary condition for this equilibrium
6Since agents are immobile and the population is evenly spread across ℵrich and ℵpoor, and since
the allocation of talent is random, the shares of talented and non-talented agents are equal within as
well as across regions in any stationary equilibrium.
7It can be shown that the results of the next section are the same in the case where interregional
and interpersonal inequality are deﬁned in terms of consumption, rather than income. In other words,
fruit and berries may be included in the inequality measures without loss of generality.
7is τ<
2λx
(1−λ)(y+x), while the degrees of interregional and interpersonal inequality are8
Σ1 =
1
2 ((1 − 2τ)(y + x) − 2x) (3.1)
σ1 =
1
4 ((1 − τ)y − ￿ w)
2 +
1







2 (x + y) − ￿ w
￿2
(3.2)
where ￿ w ≡
1
















In the second equilibrium, the tax rate and thus the interregional transfer is high enough
to induce residents of the poor region to work less and enjoy more leisure. The suﬃcient




λx , while the degrees
of interregional and interpersonal inequality are
Σ2 = 1
2 (1 − 2τ)(y + x) (3.4)
σ2 =
1
4 ((1 − τ)y − ￿ w)
2 +
1






2τ (y + x) − ￿ w
￿2
(3.5)
where ￿ w ≡ 1
















In the third equilibrium, the tax rate is high enough to induce not only residents of
ℵpoor, but also low-paid residents of ℵrich, to re-allocate time from labour to leisure,
thus only high-paid agents ﬁnd it worthwhile to devote time to working. The suﬃcient




λy , while the degrees of
interregional and interpersonal inequality are
Σ3 =
1
2 (1 − 2τ)y (3.7)
σ3 =
1
4 ((1 − τ)y − ￿ w)
2 +
1









8The existence of equilibrium 1 is proved in Appendix A.
8where ￿ w ≡
1
















The assumption below ensures that the average after-tax income is at least as high
in ℵrich as in ℵpoor at all feasible tax rates.
Assumption 1. Assume that
y−x
2(y+x) > 2λx




Note that the second part of Assumption 1 implies, together with the non-negativity
condition on the tax rate
λx−q
λx , that the upper bound of y is 2x.
3.4. Equilibrium 4
Finally, in the fourth equilibrium, the tax rate is high enough to discourage all agents
from working. Hence, residents of ℵrich as well as ℵpoor supply zero labour, subsist-
ing instead by collecting fruit and berries. The suﬃcient and necessary condition for
this equilibrium is τ>
λy−q
λy . Moreover, the degrees of interregional and interpersonal
inequality are Σ4 = σ4 = 0, while society’s welfare is given by W4 = qθ.
4. The Effects of Redistributive Income Taxation
In this section, we consider the eﬀects of increasing the rate of income redistribution
from the rich to the poor neighbourhood. Henceforth, τ0 and τ￿ refer to initial and
current tax rates, respectively, while σ[τ], Σ[τ]a n dW [τ] refer to the degrees of inter-
personal and interregional inequality and the level of social welfare at the tax rate τ.
According to the ﬁrst of the deﬁnitions below, tax increases that induce agents to alter
their labour supply decisions and thus cause the economy to jump from one equilibrium
to another, are referred to as non-marginal, while tax increases that leave individual
allocations unaﬀected are referred to as marginal.
Moreover, according to the second deﬁnition, an economy in which the rate of re-
distributive taxation is not high enough to aﬀect individuals’ labour supply allocations
is referred to as a low-tax society, while an economy where taxes are distortionary is
9referred to as a high-tax society. In terms of this deﬁnition, an economy that fulﬁls the
suﬃcient and necessary conditions for equilibrium 1 may be thought of as a low-tax
society, while an economy that meets the conditions for equilibrium 2, 3 or 4 may rather
be described as a high-tax society.
Finally, according to the third deﬁnition, the degree of pre-tax income dispersion is
measured as the ratio of the high and the low income realization, respectively.


































, then τ￿ −τ0 is a
marginal tax increase.




λx and τ∗∗∗ ≡
λy−q
λy . Also, deﬁne a low-tax society as an economy in which the tax rate falls short of
τ∗, and a high-tax society as an economy where the tax rate exceeds τ∗.
Deﬁnition 5. Deﬁne the degree of income dispersion, δ,a s
y
x.
Note that any marginal increase in redistributive taxation causes interregional as
well as interpersonal inequality to decrease, and social welfare to increase.9 Note also
that any non-marginal increase in the tax rate that is large enough to discourage all
agents in the economy from working unambiguously reduces interregional and interper-
sonal inequality as well as social welfare. In what follows, the implications of any other
non-marginal tax increases are analyzed. The proofs of all propositions in this section
are gathered in Appendix B.
The propositions below establish that the eﬀects of interregional redistributive tax-
ation on interregional and interpersonal inequality depend on the degree of income
dispersion in the economy as well as on the initial tax level and the magnitude of the
tax increase. Particularly, in a low-tax economy where the dispersion of pre-tax income
is narrow enough, any non-marginal increase in the rate of interregional redistribution
9This result follows from Assumption 1, the convexity of σk, and the concavity of Wk, where
k =1 ,2,3.
10produces an increase in interregional and interpersonal inequality, while in a high-tax
economy, increases in the rate of redistributive taxation unambiguously cause interre-
gional as well as interpersonal inequality to decline.
Proposition 1. The more narrow is the dispersion of pre-tax regional income, the
more likely is a non-marginal increase in the rate of interregional redistributive taxation
to enhance interregional inequality. Moreover, the likelihood of a non-marginal tax
increase to enhance interpersonal income inequality increases in the degree of income
dispersion, δ,i fδ<￿ δ(τ0,τ∗), where ∂￿ δ
∂τ0 > 0 and ∂￿ δ
∂τ∗ < 0, and decreases in δ otherwise.
Proposition 2. If q>2
3λy, then a non-marginal increase in interregional redistributive
taxation generates a rise in interregional income inequality if τ0 <τ ∗, and a decline
otherwise. However, if q<
2
3λy, then the eﬀect of a non-marginal tax increase is
ambiguous.
Proposition 3. If q>
2
3λy, then any non-marginal increase in interregional redistribu-
tive taxation generates a rise in interpersonal income inequality. However, if q<
2
3λy,
then the eﬀect of a non-marginal tax increase is ambiguous.
An interesting implication of Proposition 2, 3 and 4 is that increases in the rate
of interregional income redistribution need not, contrary to their purpose, generate a
more equal distribution of income between neighbourhoods. The reason is that in-
creases in interregional redistributive taxation give rise to two eﬀects, which may be
counter-acting, on interregional (as well as interpersonal) inequality. The ﬁrst is the
equalization eﬀect, which refers to the reduction of after-taxinequality that is brought
about by an increase in redistributive taxation. The second is the allocation eﬀect,
which refers to the increase or decrease in pre-taxinequality that arises to the ex tent
that the taxincrease induces individuals in either the providing or the recipient region
to alter their labour supply decisions. If the allocation eﬀect is positive and in excess
of the equalization eﬀect, interregional inequality rises in response to non-marginal tax
increases, while in any other case, a non-marginal increase in the taxrate generates a
decline in interregional inequality.
11It turns out from Proposition 3 that increases in the rate of interregional redistribu-
tion seem to unambiguously generate lower interregional and interpersonal inequality
only to the extent that individuals’ incentives to work are unaﬀected by the tax increase,
or if the initial taxrate is already moderate or high. However, while in the former case,
the decrease in inequality is caused by the equalization eﬀect, in the latter case inequal-
ity declines as a result of a negative allocation eﬀect, that is declining labour supply
in the providing region. Furthermore, as indicated by Proposition 2, increases in the
rate of interregional redistributive taxation are more likely to produce lower inequality
if the dispersion of pre-taxincome, δ, is high between regions. The reason is that the
larger is the interregional income diﬀerential, the larger is the transfer from ℵrich to
ℵpoor for a given taxrate, and the more likely is thus the equalization eﬀect to oﬀset
the allocation eﬀect of interregional redistribution.
Another implication of the propositions above is that depending on the degree of
income dispersion before taxation, a rise in interregional transfers may produce either
a more or a less even personal income distribution. In particular, the eﬀect of a given
taxincrease on interpersonal inequality depicts a Laﬀer curve with respect to the dis-
persion of income, δ. The reason for this result is that in addition to the allocation
and equalization eﬀects described above, non-marginal taxincreases also generate a de-
equalizing eﬀect on interpersonal inequality, arising from the presence of intra-regional
income diﬀerentials. As the providing region, ℵrich, is populated by low- as well as high-
income earners, individual residents of ℵrich are not necessarily richer than residents of
the recipient region, ℵpoor. Hence, income redistribution from the rich to the poor re-
gion involves transferring income to middle-income earners not only from high-paid,
but also from low-paid individuals. This implies that residents of the recipient region
are typically made better oﬀ at the expense of the well-being of low-income earners
in the providing region, and thus that the equalizing eﬀect of interregional redistribu-
tive taxation is weakened. Clearly, the lower is the degree of income heterogeneity
within regions, the more likely are non-marginal taxincreases to equalize, rather than
de-equalize after-taxincome.
12Finally, the condition q>
2
3λy is most likely to be satisﬁed if λ is low, given the
levels of q and y. The parameter λ takes on a low value if ￿ is high and θ is low,
that is if individuals devote a larger share of their time to working, rather than leisure,
and if their marginal valuation of leisure is higher than their marginal valuation of
consumption. Since an average working week amounts to at least 40 hours for most
people, the assumption about time devoted to working seems reasonable. Further,
estimates of θ typically fall below 0.5 in most empirical studies. Thus, the restriction
on q does not seem to be too controversial.
The next proposition establishes, ﬁrstly, that in a low-tax economy, small and mod-
erate non-marginal increases in the rate of interregional redistribution give rise to higher
social welfare, while large non-marginal taxincreases generate the opposite eﬀect, and
secondly, that in a high-taxeconomy, non-marginal taxincreases unambiguously cause
society’s welfare to decline. In other words, non-marginal taxincreases are beneﬁcial
to society to the extent that they are not large enough to discourage any agents in the
rich neighbourhood from working, and detrimental otherwise.
Proposition 4. If ￿<￿ ￿, then a non-marginal increase in interregional redistributive
taxation yields a rise in social welfare if τ￿ <τ ∗∗, and a decline otherwise. However, if
￿>￿ ￿, then the eﬀect of a non-marginal tax increase is ambiguous.
An important implication of Proposition 5 is that non-marginal increases in the rate
of interregional redistribution are not necessarily beneﬁcial in terms of social welfare.
This is because redistributive taxation may give rise to two opposite eﬀects on society’s
welfare. The ﬁrst is the income eﬀect, that an increase in interregional redistribution
imposes on the utility of agents in the recipient region. The income eﬀect refers to the
decrease in labour supply, and the corresponding increase in leisure consumption, that
residents of ℵpoor can aﬀord to undertake as soon as the lump-sum transfer exceeds τ∗z.
The second is the substitution eﬀect, that an increase in the tax rate imposes on the
utility of agents in the providing region, that is the re-allocation of time from labour to




λy , respectively. To the extent that the income eﬀect on recipients’ utility
13is greater than the substitution eﬀect on taxpayers’ utility, society’s welfare increases in
response to non-marginal increases in the rate of interregional redistribution. However,
if the substitution eﬀect is stronger than the income eﬀect, non-marginal increases in
interregional redistribution rather cause social welfare to decline.
The condition ￿<￿ ￿ is typically satisﬁed if ￿ is low and θ is high. Although the
present framework does not require any formal restrictions on these parameters, it
would be empirically reasonable to assume that ￿>1−￿ and θ<1−θ (see references).
Figure 1 depicts ￿ ￿ as a function of θ. Obviously, given that the restrictions ￿>1 − ￿
and θ<1−θ be satisﬁed, the range within which ￿ falls below ￿ ￿ is relatively small, thus
￿<￿ ￿ seems to be a strong parameter restriction. However, it appears (see Appendix
B) that this condition is needed only to prove the most extreme case of the proposition.
In other words, although the restriction on ￿ and θ may be strong, it is critical to the
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Figure 1.
Table 1.
Income eﬀect Substitution eﬀect
Allocation eﬀect W ↑,Σ↑ W ↓,Σ↑
Equalization eﬀect W ↑,Σ↓ W ↓,Σ↓
Obviously, interregional income equalization is not necessarily equitable. Further,
there is no unambiguous relationship between interregional inequality, social welfare
and interpersonal inequality. In particular, there need not be a negative relationship
between interregional inequality and social welfare. The reason is, for one thing, that
14the implications of increasing the rate of interregional redistribution are determined
by the relationships between the equalization and allocation eﬀects on the one hand,
and the income and substitution eﬀects, on the other, and for another, that the relative
strength of these eﬀects seems to be highly variable with respect to the rate of taxation.




3y, that is the
case described in Proposition 3. Table 1 shows how interregional inequality and social
welfare respond to non-marginal increases in the rate of redistribution, depending on
which of these eﬀects are in dominance. Furthermore, Figure 2 depicts the consequences
of non-marginal increases in the rate of redistributive taxation in terms of welfare and
interregional equity, depending on the initial tax rate and the size of the tax increase.
∆Σ
W ∆
eq. 1→ eq. 2
eq. 1→ eq. 3
marginal
i
eq. 2→ eq. 3
Figure 2.
Clearly, Figure 1 indicates that the eﬀects of an increase in the rate of interregional
redistribution on interregional inequality and social welfare are highly dependent on
the initial rate of taxation as well as on the magnitude of the tax increase. In the case
of a low-tax society, a small or moderate non-marginal increase in the rate of taxation
causes interregional as well as interpersonal inequality to rise, rather than to decline.
However, at the same time the tax increase implies a rise in social welfare, albeit
at the cost of lower labour market participation (cf the upper right corner of Figure
1). In comparison, a large non-marginal increase in redistributive taxation not only
causes interregional and interpersonal inequality to rise, but also generates a decline in
social welfare (cf the lower right corner of Figure 1). In the case of a high-tax society,
15on the other hand, non-marginal increases in redistributive taxation typically reduce
interregional inequality, although at the expense of increased interpersonal inequality,
reduced social welfare and lower labour market participation (cf the lower left corner
of Figure 1).
The eﬀects of increasing the rate of interregional redistribution also seem to be
sensitive to the degree of pre-tax income dispersion as well as the degree of income
heterogeneity within the neighbourhoods. In particular, the degrees of interregional as
well as interpersonal income inequality are less likely to rise in response to non-marginal
tax increases if the degree of pre-tax income dispersion is high between, but not within
regions. The reason is that the greater is the extent to which interregional redistribution
coincides with redistribution from the rich to the poor, the less likely is the tax increase
to generate adverse eﬀects on interregional and interpersonal inequality. It follows that
interregional redistribution seems most likely to be beneﬁcial in terms of inequality as
well as social welfare in low-tax societies, where the degree of interregional, but not the
intra-regional income dispersion is high. The reason is that while marginal or small
marginal tax increases in a low-tax economy always cause society’s welfare to increase,
they are less likely to give rise to increases in interregional and interpersonal inequality
if the dispersion of income is wide between, but narrow within regions.
In summary, the analysis indicates that due to its uncertain implications, interre-
gional redistributive taxation seems to be a fairly ineﬃcient policy tool. For one thing,
although increases in the rate of interregional redistribution are beneﬁcial to society
to some extent, they are also highly likely to generate not only rising interregional
and interpersonal inequality, but also declining aggregate working hours and destroyed
incentives for residents of the recipient region. For another, the fact that providing
and recipient regions need not be populated exclusively by rich and poor individuals,
respectively, inevitably addresses the question whether resident- rather than source-
based redistribution is equitable. The earliest proponent of so-called horizontal equity,
that is the idea that individuals or groups with the same income should not be subject
to diﬀerent rates of taxation, was James Buchanan. In a seminal paper (Buchanan
16[1950]), he questioned the ethics of inter-governmental grants, arguing that redistri-
bution schemes should be targeted at individuals only, not taking into account their
residence. Although not undisputed, this idea seems to have been generally accepted
in the literature (see Mieszkowski and Musgrave [1999] for a discussion of Buchanan’s
argument and an overview of subsequent contributions in the ﬁeld). For instance,
Yinger [1986] advocates the principle of ”fair compensation”, that is the idea that an
individual’s tax burden should be independent of her residence.
However, to the extent that the political goal of redistribution is equality in eco-
nomic opportunity, rather than in income or public consumption, there might be a case
for interregional equalization. For example, as suggested by Oakland [1994], interre-
gional transfers may be used to correct for regional diﬀerentials in the cost of providing
public goods and services, supplies of natural resources or local opportunities in terms
of education or employment.10 In a model where individuals are mobile between re-
gions, the target of equalization is likely to be even more critical to the implications
of interregional redistribution.11 Particularly, a redistributive policy that successfully
equalizes educational or professional opportunity, rather than regional income, might
possibly prevent de-population of less developed regions.
In this framework, introducing mobility would imply that talented agents who were
born in ℵpoor, that is type ϕ agents, improve their job opportunities by moving to
ℵrich, while untalented agents who were born in ℵrich, that is type β agents, increase
their after-tax income by re-locating to ℵpoor. Consequently, depending on the rate of
taxation and the cost of moving, the analysis would give rise to a large number of short-
term equilibria with varying population distributions, and two long-run equilibria. In
those short-run equilibria where the tax rate is suﬃciently low, ϕ agents, but not β
agents would ﬁnd it worthwhile to re-locate. Thus, all talented and some untalented
agents would concentrate in ℵrich, while those who were born untalented in ℵpoor would
10A discussion of the eﬃciency of educational equalization in the US is provided by Reschovsky
[1994].
11The assumption of mobility opens up for further arguments in favour of residential taxation; see
for example Inman and Rubinfeld [1996] and Oakland [1994].
17choose to stay there. Moreover, in short-run equilibria where the tax rate is higher,
all untalented and some talented agents would be concentrated in ℵrich, while those
who were born talented in ℵrich would remain there. Accordingly, in the two long-run
equilibria, all agents would reside either in the rich or in the poor neighbourhood. This
result is similar to that of Wildasin [1991], where unequal transfer levels across regions




brain-drain immobility tax escape
Figure 3.
However, alternating the framework so that the aim of equalization is to improve
the economic opportunity of residents of the poor region, does not necessarily yield the
same implications. Rather, to the extent that grants to ℵpoor are successfully used to ex-
tend the variety of job opportunities in the region, thus giving type ϕ agents incentives
to stay there, and that the tax burden of residents of ℵrich is not excessive, interregional
transfers may possibly enhance eﬃciency as well as equity, without generating adverse
side eﬀects on labour supply (as in the present framework). Nevertheless, as improve-
ment of regional employment opportunities in ℵpoor most likely requires a minimum
level of investment, low levels of interregional transfers may not be suﬃcient to prevent
migration of talented agents, or brain-drain, from ℵpoor to ℵrich. Likewise, if taxation
becomes too burdensome, type β agents, and eventually type α agents, will typically
migrate from ℵrich to ℵpoor in order to escape taxes. Figure 3 depicts the degree of
mobility with respect to the rate of interregional redistributive taxation.
185. Concluding Remarks
I have shown that increases in the rate of interregional redistribution need not generate
neither reduced interregional inequality nor higher social welfare, and that their eﬀects
are highly dependent on the initial state of the economy. In particular, interregional
redistribution seems most likely to be beneﬁcial in low-tax societies, where the degree
of income dispersion is high between, but not within regions.
Clearly, a variety of extensions of the current model remain to be analyzed. Among
these are, for instance, the assumption of geographical mobility. In the present frame-
work, introducing mobility would merely give rise to new non-interior equilibria, that
is equilibria with congestion or depopulation. However, in combination with more
complex preferences, or a more advanced accumulation technology, a framework where
workers are mobile could possibly yield new results. In the former case, a possible
extension would be to deﬁne preferences over residence as well as consumption and
leisure. This approach would typically imply that redistributive taxation be even more
harmful to eﬃciency and equity than in the present framework, but not necessarily to
society’s welfare. In the latter case, an interesting approach would be to study the
welfare implications of interregional income redistribution in the presence of local or
global human capital spillovers. Particularly, it would be interesting to analyze the op-
timal distribution of individuals across regions in the case of local spillovers, or so-called
neighbourhood eﬀects. Nevertheless, these are topics for future papers.
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Appendix A
The proposition below ensures the existence of an equilibrium where the tax rate
is high enough to aﬀect the incentives of residents of the poor, but not the rich neigh-
bourhood.
Proposition 5. The tax rate at which individuals in ℵpoor decide to cut their labour





Proof. Suppose that the tax rate at which poor residents of ℵrich decide to quit working





Then, in order for (the ﬁrst part of) Assumption 1 to be satisﬁed, that is the assumption
that the average regional after-tax income be at least as high in ℵrich as in ℵpoor at any




(1−λ)y. In turn, this implies that λ<
y−2x
2x+y. However,











Proof of Proposition 2. Consider ﬁrst the implications of non-marginal tax
increases on interregional inequality. The net change in interregional inequality as the
21economy jumps from equilibrium 1 to 2, from equilibrium 1 to 3 and from equilibrium
2 to 3, respectively, is given by
Σ2 − Σ1 = −1
2 (τ
￿ − τ0)y + 1
2 (1 −τ
￿ + τ0)x

















Σ3 − Σ2 = −
1
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Clearly, all these expressions are decreasing functions of y, and hence by
y
x. Consider
now the eﬀects of non-marginal tax increases on interpersonal inequality. The net
change in interpersonal inequality as the economy jumps from equilibrium 1 to 2, from
equilibrium 1 to 3and from equilibrium 2 to 3 , respect ively, is given by
σ2 − σ1 =
1
8 (3τ
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Note ﬁrst that by Assumption 1, it must hold that 4−3τ￿−3τ0 > 0. Then, the ﬁrst

























x) < 0 otherwise.
Moreover, it is easy to see that the critical values of
y
x are also decreasing in τ￿, and
increasing in τ0. This veriﬁes the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. The diﬀerence in interregional income inequality, Σ,
between equilibrium j and k, is positive for all feasible τ by transitivity if Σmin
k −Σmax
j >
0, and negative if Σmax
k − Σmin
j < 0, where j and k denote the initial and current
equilibrium, respectively. Consider ﬁrst the cases where τ0 <τ ∗, that is the cases
where the economy jumps from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2 and 3, respectively. In the
former case, the diﬀerence in Σ is positive if Σmin
2 −Σmax
1 > 0, that is if Σ2 [τ∗∗]−Σ1 [0] >








y+x, that is if 1
2λy
y−x
y+x > 0, which is obviously true. Thus, it holds that Σ2−Σ1 > 0.
In the latter case, the diﬀerence in Σ is positive if Σmin
3 − Σmax
1 > 0, that is if
Σ3 [τ∗∗∗]−Σ1 [0] > 0, where Σ1 and Σ3 are given by (3.1) and (3.7). Thus, Σ3 −Σ1 > 0













2x>y . In turn, this inequality is satisﬁed by the conditions q>
2
3λy and q<λ x .
Hence, it must hold that Σ3 − Σ1 > 0.
Consider ﬁnally the case where τ0 >τ ∗, that is the case where the economy jumps
from equilibrium 2 to equilibrium 3. In this case, the diﬀerence in Σ is negative if
Σmax
3 − Σmin
2 < 0, that is if Σ3 [τ∗∗] − Σ2 [τ∗∗] < 0, where Σ2 and Σ3 are given by (3.4)
and (3.7). Hence, Σ3 − Σ2 < 0 if and only if q>1
2λx, which is true by the second
part of Assumption 1 and transitivity. It follows that Σ3 − Σ2 < 0. This veriﬁes the
Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4. The change in interpersonal inequality, σ, between
equilibrium j and k, is positive for all feasible τ by transitivity if σmin
k −σmax
j > 0, and
negative if σmax
k − σmin
j < 0, where j and k denote the initial and current equilibrium,
respectively. It follows that in the case where the economy jumps from equilibrium 1 to
equilibrium 2, the change in interpersonal inequality is positive for all τ if σmin
2 −σmax
1 >
0, that is if σ2 [τ∗∗] − σ1 [0] > 0, where σ1 and σ2 are given by (3.2) and (3.5). Thus,






Clearly, (5.3) is satisﬁed by transitivity and the second part of Assumption 1 if the
RHSfalls below
λy
2 . In turn, this condition is satisﬁed if and only if y>x , which is
deﬁnitely true. Hence, it must hold that σ2 − σ1 > 0.
Further, in the case where the economy jumps from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 3,
the change in σ is positive for all τ if σmin
3 − σmax
1 > 0, that is if σ3 [τ∗∗∗] − σ1 [0] > 0,






Clearly, it must hold that if q>
2
3λy,( 5 .4) is satisﬁed by transitivity if the RHS
falls short of 2




(4y − 3x)(2y −3x), which is
clearly satisﬁed for all y<2x. Consequently, it must hold that σ3 − σ1 > 0.
Finally, in the case where the economy jumps from equilibrium 2 to equilibrium 3,
the change in σ is positive for all τ if and only if σmin
3 − σmax
2 > 0, that is if σ3 [τ∗∗∗] −








Equation (5.5) is satisﬁed by the second part of Assumption 1 and transitivity if
λy
2





which is clearly true for all non-negative y and x. It follows that σ3 −σ2 > 0. This
veriﬁes the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5. The change in social welfare, W, between equilibrium j
and k, is positive or non-decreasing for all feasible τ by transitivity if W min
k −W max
j ≥
0, and negative if W max
k − W min
j < 0, where j and k denote the initial and current
equilibrium, respectively. Consider ﬁrst the case where τ￿ <τ ∗∗, that is the case where
the economy jumps from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2. The change in social welfare
is positive for all τ if W min
2 −W max
1 > 0, that is if W2 [τ∗]−W1 [τ∗] ≥ 0, where W1 and


















λ, which is clearly satisﬁed.
It follows that W2 − W1 ≥ 0.
24Consider now the cases where τ￿ >τ ∗∗. In the case where the economy jumps from
equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 3, the change in W is negative for all τ if W max
3 −W min
1 < 0,
that is if W3 [τ∗∗∗] − W1 [0] < 0, where W3 and W1 are given by (3.9) and (3.3). Thus,











+( λy − q)
θ < 0 (5.7)
It can be shown that the LHS of (5.7) decreases in q as well as in x. Hence, (5.7)




















Note that the LHS of (5.8) is equivalent to ￿ ￿. Hence, given that ￿ is assumed to fall
below ￿ ￿,( 5 .8) is satisﬁed. In otherwor ds, it must hold that W3 − W1 < 0.
Finally, in the case where the economy jumps from equilibrium 2 to equilibrium
3, the change in social welfare is negative for all τ if W max
3 − W min
2 < 0, that is if
W3 [τ∗∗∗] − W2 [τ∗] < 0. Recall that it was shown above that W3 [τ∗∗∗] <W 1 [0] and
that W2 [τ∗] >W 1 [τ∗]. Since W is an increasing function of τ, it must holdthat
W3 [0] <W 1 [τ∗]. Hence, it is impliedby transitivity that W3 [τ∗∗∗] <W 2 [τ∗] and,
consequently, that W3 − W2 < 0. This veriﬁes the Proposition.
25